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Abstract  
Transmission and System Operator (TSO) is 
the power flows externality market designer. 
And so, not only is TSO a module of power 
markets but its missions that are related to the 
management of power flows can also be 
studied thanks to a modular analysis. An ideal 
first-best TSO can then emerge as a 
benchmark for comparison with real TSOs. The 
governance structure of TSO accounts for the 
gap between such an ideal first-best and real 
TSOs. Then, although the economic theory 
specifies a unique arrangement to reach 
efficiency, the diversity of transmission 
governance accounts for the diversity of 
arrangements to manage power flows. 
Moreover the comparison between an ideal 
first-best TSO and two reference TSOs, PJM 
and NGC, with quite opposite features accounts 
for heterogeneous results among TSOs. 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
One knows that Transmission and 
System Operator (TSO) is a module of 
power markets (see [15]). In this paper we 
only focus on the management of power 
flows and do not deal with balancing 
issues. As for the management of power 
flows, a TSO must achieve three main 
interdependent missions: the short-run 
power flows externality management, the 
development of the network (see [3]) and 
the coordination with neighbouring TSOs to 
deal with border effects (see [7]). So the 
management of power flows by TSO can 
also be studied thanks to a modular 
analysis. And an ideal first-best TSO can 
then be designed by implementing the 
most efficient solutions for these three 
missions. Nonetheless, reference TSOs 
such as PJM and NGC are not ideal TSOs. 
The governance structure of transmission 
(or transmission governance) imposes 
compatibility constraints between the 
implementations of TSO’s missions and 
accounts for the gap between an ideal first-
best TSO and real TSOs.  
We show that a TSO can be studied 
thanks to a modular analysis framework as 
for the management of power flows. The 
modules are its three missions and 
transmission governance. We also show 
that transmission governance accounts for 
the wide diversity of arrangements of TSOs 
and their inhomogeneous results.  
In section 2, we present the three 
missions of TSO that are operational 
modules of the analysis framework and 
their possible implementations. An ideal 
first-best TSO is designed thanks to the 
most efficient implementations.  
In section 3, we define a last module, 
transmission governance, and show that it 
introduces compatibility constraints 
between the implementations of TSO’s 
missions.  
In section 4, the two reference TSOs, 
PJM and NGC, with quite opposite features 
are studied thanks to our modular and 
institutional analysis framework.  
2.  A MODULAR ANALYSIS 
FRAMEWORK 
 
The implementations of the three TSO’s 
missions for the management of power 
flows are differentiated thanks to their level 
of internalisation of the power flows 
externality in price mechanisms. These 
implementations are presented assuming 
that the TSO is benevolent and efficient. An 
ideal first-best TSO is designed as a 
benchmark thanks to the most efficient 
implementations. 
 
2.1. The short-run power flows 
externality management 
 
There exist two main solutions with 
opposite levels of integration between the 
externality management scheme and the 
energy market to internalise network 
externality in energy price.  
The nodal pricing is in theory the most 
efficient method since the power flows 
externality is internalised in the energy 
market. It gives an energy price per node 
indicating where it is preferable to generate 
or to consume one more megawatt taking 
into account both network losses and 
limitations while maximising the social 
surplus (see [14]). The differential of nodal 
prices linked to externality generates a 
merchandise surplus for TSO. The network 
limitations generate also a social cost.  
Under the redispatch scheme, the 
energy market is cleared “out of the 
network” at a unique system marginal price 
(SMP). TSO manages externality apart 
from the energy market by “constraining 
on” (and pay Pon) or “off” (and is paid Poff 
by) some generators or consumers. The 
subsequent redispatch cost is borne by 
TSO for the short-run operation, and 
generally socialised to the long-term in the 
Use of the System (UoS) tariff. Only the 
redispatched units know that there are 
network constraints.  
Each scheme can be subject to a more 
or less wide use of local market power by 
reliability-must-run generators. The 
redispatch scheme is said to be more 
sensitive to these issues because the 
congestion cost is socialised ([9]). 
However, this scheme facilitates the use of 
standardised forward products on energy 
markets which may increase liquidity of 
marketplaces and therefore mitigate 
oligopolies’ market power. There is a 
balance to find between increasing 
internalisation externality in energy prices, 
mitigating local market power and 
increasing liquidity of power marketplaces. 
 
2.2. The development of the network 
 
The development of the network is a 
two-part TSO’s mission. The benevolent 
TSO invests to make the social cost 
decrease. And long-term locational network 
tariffs must complete the short-run signals 
to guide the location of new network users 
and to recover the network costs (see [13]). 
There is no ideal theoretical solution to 
define this tariff and to allocate the network 
charges but only pragmatic ones that 
internalise more or less network externality.  
As for the development of the network, 
the benevolent TSO arbitrates between on 
the one hand the social cost noticed from 
the short-run operation and anticipated 
from the connection requests and on the 
other hand the cost of network 
investments. Other things equal, it is 
equivalent to a social welfare maximisation 
(see [13]).  
As for the allocation of network charges, 
there are three main methods. 
Accommodation capacities can complete 
them.  
Under the “deep” cost allocation 
method, “connection assets” and “network 
upgrades” are attributed to the network 
users that trigger the investments through a 
connection tariff. This method is 
controversial. Costs that are associated to 
the lumpiness of the transmission line 
capacity are individually allocated. And it is 
a one-way internalisation as positive 
externalities are not rewarded.  
Under the “shallow” cost allocation 
method, the beneficiaries pay only the 
“shallow” part of the network, that is to say 
the “direct connection assets” through a 
connection tariff. The “network upgrades” 
are socialised among all or part of the 
network users through a UoS tariff. The 
network users are then only incited to be 
near the core of the network. 
Under the “zonal” allocation method, the 
connection tariff is the same one as in a 
shallow allocation method but the UoS 
tariffs are spatially differentiated. Lots of 
variants are possible. It is an interesting 
method as positive externality can be 
internalised at least partly. 
The publication of “accommodation 
capacities” should make the allocation 
method more auditable to the network 
users. The “accommodation capacity” of a 
node is the nodal quantity of new 
generation or consumption that can be 
connected to this node without creating 
new congestion. 
 
2.3. The coordination of TSOs 
 
The third TSO’s mission is to coordinate 
with neighbouring TSOs to internalise 
external loop flows. TSO can then optimally 
use all interconnected power resources. 
The coordination between TSOs includes 
both their externality management 
schemes and their long-term network 
developments. The issue of compensation 
between coordinated parties is not 
considered here and is still to be tackled by 
literature. 
“Standardisation” and “combination” are 
the two main ways of coordinating adjacent 
systems (see [7]). The coordination by 
“standardisation” implies that each TSO 
elects the same implementations for the 
two previous modules and communicate a 
minimal set of data on the state of its 
network (see [4] for a coordinated 
externality management). The coordination 
by “combination” needs the implementation 
of standard inter-TSO footbridges to allow 
the coexistence of different individual 
schemes.  
Standardisation achieves full efficiency 
while combination is only a second-best. 
Nevertheless, depending on its cost 
compared to its benefit, the coordination by 
combination or no coordination at all may 
be optimal.  
The most efficient type of coordination 
depends on the topology of both TSOs’ 
networks. The more meshed the networks 
are, the more efficient the coordination is to 
deal with border effects (see [5]). 
 
2.4. An ideal first-best TSO 
 
The efficient implementation of the 
modules of this analysis framework 
constitutes an Ideal first-best TSO (ITSO). 
An ITSO must send economic signals to 
the network users to ensure an efficient 
use of the network. An ITSO efficiently 
develops the network. And an ITSO must 
coordinate with its neighbours to internalise 
the border effects. 
To conclude, an ITSO is designed as 
follow: 
 
Table 1 An ideal first-best TSO 
 
 
3.  COMPATIBILITY OF TSO’S 
MODULES  
 
In reality, there is no guaranty that a 
TSO is benevolent. It may face 
contradictions between its private agenda 
and ITSO missions. Transmission 
governance accounts for the possible gap 
between real TSOs and the ITSO in such 
matters. This may generate some 
compatibility constraints between the 
implementations TSO’s missions. 
First, we show that transmission 
governance mainly relies on Transmission 
Ownership unbundling and impacts 
regulation and market design. Lastly, we 
study three kinds of compatibility 
constraints between the modules of real 
TSOs that transmission governance 
imposes. 
 
Missions of TSO  Ideal first best TSO 
Externality management Nodal pricing 
Network development 
 Investments 
Social cost minimisation, 
centralised by TSO 
 Tariffs Zonal tariffs + 
Accommodation capacities 
Coordination with TSOs By Standardisation 
 
3.1. Transmission governance 
 
Transmission unbundling from 
incumbent utilities provides more than a 
non-discriminatory open access to the 
network. It is the ground of transmission 
governance and frames the compatibility 
constraints of the implementations of 
TSO’s missions.  
First, we point out the rationale of 
unbundling transmission ownership. 
Second, we see the impact of transmission 
governance on the regulation of TSO. 
Third, we see the impact of governmental 
energy policy, regulation and transmission 
governance on how power flows externality 
is considered in market design. 
 
Unbundling transmission ownership 
 
Transmission Ownership unbundling is 
frequently assumed. However, it is 
constrained by the possibility of divesting 
network from incumbents and the wideness 
of border effects. 
The divestiture of system operation is 
widely recognised as a necessary 
prerequisite in a deregulated process and 
rather easy to impose: it stands only for few 
immediate financial stakes although those 
stakes may prove to be strategic in terms 
of entry barriers to third party network 
access. To the contrary, the divestiture of 
the transmission ownership may be hard to 
impose in the legal framework. Network 
ownership in an industrial activity, often 
held by private companies, to which it 
provides a riskless regulated revenue is 
attractive in the context of uncertainty of a 
power market.  
Border effects also influence network 
unbundling. If transmission ownership and 
system operation are balkanised and 
uncoordinated, loop flows create numerous 
border effects that even an unbundling of 
both operation and ownership may not be 
sufficient to deal with. A merger of the 
divested System Operators (SO) in a third 
party, an Independent System Operator 
(ISO) keeps the industrial structure quite 
unchanged while the horizontal integration 
internalise border effects. For the rest of 
this paper, “TOSO” refers to a TSO that 
owns part or the whole network it operates 
while “SO” refers to a TSO that owns no 
network asset and “TSO” is used as a 
generic term referring without distinction to 
both. 
 
Incentive regulation 
 
Ownership unbundling has 
consequences on the governance and on 
the incentive regulation of the transmission 
monopoly.  
Regulatory incentives are delicate to be 
imposed on a SO due to its small financial 
size. A self-regulated not-for-profit 
organisation is an alternative to a for-profit 
one (see [1]). Indeed, the participation of 
transmission owners and network users in 
such organisation should ensure its 
neutrality and its de facto regulation if there 
is no risk of collusion or capture of the 
organisation by a lobbying group. It is the 
typical stakeholder participation to the ISO 
governance in the USA.  
On the contrary, the regulator can 
incentivise a TOSO on its controllable costs 
to set its monopoly price. The possible 
financial penalties from the incentive 
regulation have no severe consequences 
for the TSO’s survival thanks to its tariffs 
revenues.  
To conclude, a SO will be preferably 
not-for-profit self-regulated because it 
cannot support an incentive regulation. On 
the contrary, an incentive regulation is less 
risky for a TOSO thanks to its tariffs 
revenues. 
 
Power flows externality and market design 
 
As System Operator, a TSO is also the 
main architect of the market design as for 
power flows externality. Then, over 
transmission governance the consistency 
of governmental energy policy and political 
economy may interfere with power flows 
externality market design.  
A TOSO may defend its own financial 
stakes while designing the market of power 
flows externality. To the contrary, a SO is 
theoretically neutral while designing the 
market of power flows externality thanks to 
a stakeholder process that is assumed to 
be balanced. Then, SOs are also less 
subject to incompatibilities in the 
construction of a regional market design. 
Beside its role of control vis-à-vis the 
TSO’s costs, the regulator may have to 
take into account tradeoffs due to 
governmental energy policy ambiguity. For 
instance, efficient locational signals can 
penalise wind energy since windfarms are 
generally far from consumption and so 
require huge network investments. The 
regulator may also have to reach an 
agreement on redistribution of costs and 
benefits induced by any modification of 
market rules related to power flows 
externality. 
To conclude, power flows externality 
market design may be suboptimal 
depending not only on ownership 
unbundling but also on inconsistent 
governmental energy policy and political 
economy. 
 
Conclusion about transmission governance 
 
The governance of TSOs results in a 
compromise between its regulation, and 
market and coordination design. A TOSO 
can be incentivised but its financial stakes 
may interfere in market and coordination 
design while a SO may be easier to 
coordinate but harder to regulate and 
incentivise. 
 
3.2. Compatibility of modules 
 
Transmission governance imposes 
compatibility constraints between the 
implementations of TSO’s missions. We 
study three kinds of compatibility 
constraints. First, incentivising easily a 
TSO is important to ensure an efficient 
network development. Second, locational 
signals coordinate the network users with 
the network accommodation capacity 
despite network unbundling. Finally, an 
inter-TSO scheme allows an efficient use of 
the meshed nature of the transmission 
network. 
 
Compatibility constraints due to incentive 
regulation 
 
The TSO faces different incentives in 
managing and investing depending on the 
combination of transmission governance 
and the externality management scheme.  
Although the nodal pricing scheme is 
efficient in inciting the dispatch of the 
network users and partly their locations, it 
entices a profit-maximising TSO to 
underinvest and to oversize the congestion 
rent (see [12]). Therefore, a TSO that 
manages network externality thanks to 
nodal pricing will require a more 
demanding regulatory scheme to 
compensate the counter-incentive effect of 
the congestion rent. 
On the contrary, although a redispatch 
scheme seems inefficient to deal with 
short-run externality, it makes the TSO 
facing directly short-run operation 
congestion costs. A profit-maximising TSO 
compares these operation costs with 
investment costs and so approximates a 
social welfare maximisation (see 2.2). The 
regulator can then rather easily check the 
compatibility between economically 
efficient investment planning and 
externality costs.  
Whatever the market design, one could 
compel TSO to calculate the social cost of 
externality and so to ensure an open 
access of the regulator to this information. 
However, one must keep in mind that only 
a TOSO can be incentivised on the 
socialised costs. If the TSO is a SO, a 
nodal pricing appears to be a better option, 
all the more that it is not-for-profit and so 
insensitive to congestion rent. 
 
Compatibility constraints due to locational 
signals 
 
The allocation of network charges can 
incentivise the location of network users. 
But, the efficient location of network users 
may be contradictory with other goals of 
the governmental energy policy that require 
huge network investments. As for the 
externality management scheme, not only 
does it face compatibility constraints from 
regulation, but it is also insufficient in 
emitting long-term locational signals.  
Even if nodal prices provide a local 
value of the network constraints, they do 
not measure the impact of a new 
investment on other nodes and are not 
efficient as long-term locational signals. 
Moreover, they do not internalise some 
externalities, for instance network reliability. 
Therefore, a locational network tariff is 
necessary to deal with the indivisibilities 
and the externality of the network 
investments. The zonal allocation method 
is a pragmatic solution and consists in 
keeping the non-discriminatory approach of 
socialisation and in incentivising the 
connection area of new users.  
Public accommodation capacities can 
make the cost allocation method more 
auditable to the network users. However, 
such information can be hard to compute 
since the accommodation capacities of 
nodes are interdependent and may vary 
from a connection request to another. If 
nodal accommodation capacities are 
available, they may not be simultaneously 
feasible. 
However zonal tariffs and accomodation 
capacities may have a limited impact on 
the location of the network users compared 
to other constraints, as their primary 
resources (water, wind, coal, etc…) 
 
Compatibility constraints due to the 
coordination between TSOs  
 
We saw that transmission governance 
frames the individual schemes of TSO. As 
a result, the respective transmission 
governances frame the coordination 
between TSOs.  
Locational methods are a better choice 
of standardisation for coordination since 
they can internalise not only internal but 
also external loop flows and so border 
effects. Otherwise, the coordination may 
require an inter-TSO footbridge if the 
individual schemes completed by data 
exchanges are not sufficient.  
Therefore, coordination must also be 
desired by each organisational structure of 
transmission. Such a concerted 
mobilisation is hard to gather (see [7]). A 
competent “supra-organisation” (regulator 
or government) surrounding the parties to 
be coordinated is necessary at least to 
incentivise compensation rules associated 
to the development of coordination, at most 
to ease the evolution towards a 
standardised coordination. 
 
4.  STUDY OF PJM AND NGC 
 
NGC and PJM are briefly compared to 
“an ideal first-best TSO” thanks to our 
common modular analysis. We focus on 
the study of compatibility constraints 
between operational modules.  
 
4.1. Comparison of PJM to the ITSO 
 
PJM is often quoted as an example to 
be followed for the creation of a system 
operator ruling wide areas.  
As for externality management, PJM 
uses nodal pricing, for congestion 
management only. Losses must be 
integrated in its nodal pricing scheme to 
reach the best practices of externality 
internalisation of other SOs.  
As for the development of the network, 
PJM must improve its too simplistic 
criterion that is based on congestion 
thresholds to evaluate the economic 
opportunity of its Economic Planned 
Transmission Facilities. The arbitrage 
between short-run operation costs and 
investment costs is made without directly 
calculating congestion cost but just 
estimating it ([10]). Moreover, neither 
losses nor unsupplied energy are taken 
into account during the decision process. 
Investment decisions are eventually based 
on a snapshot, ignoring uncertainty about 
future flows. 
As for the coordination between TSOs, 
such a wide operator solves an important 
part of border effects and coordination with 
neighbours is theoretically fully achievable.  
Implementations of PJM’s modules are 
summed up in the following chart: 
 
Table 2 Comparison between PJM and an 
ITSO 
 
 
4.2. Compatibility of the PJM’s modules 
Clarity of regulation 
 
The reform of the power industry in the 
USA faces up against the dual structure of 
its regulation with one federal energy 
regulator, the FERC, and fifty state 
regulators, the PUCs. The FERC whose 
jurisdiction is limited to the interconnected 
wholesale markets leads the deregulation 
process. The desirability of deregulation 
differs from state to state. Their jurisdiction 
surrounds bundled activities and in 
particular transmission. It makes the 
deregulation process more difficult for the 
FERC to implement. 
However, even if the FERC cannot 
impose full transmission unbundling to the 
power industry, it achieved success in 
providing non-discriminatory open access 
to transmission network thanks to 
unbundling system operation only.  
 
Transmission governance 
 
ISOs control wide areas to internalise 
wide border effects between the utility 
areas. Their asset-poor not-for-profit 
structure imposes a self-regulation. 
However, an overrepresentation of 
generators in the governance structure can 
undermine the costs control of this 
monopoly. 
Considering the numerous border 
effects between the numerous utility areas 
(around 400 utilities), the FERC was more 
concerned about creating operators over 
wide areas than about divesting 
transmission ownership that would not 
have resolved this critical issue. 
So the ISOs are SOs. Therefore, they 
cannot support an incentive regulation, all 
the more that they are generally not-for-
profit. As monopolies, ISOs are self-
regulated thanks to sophisticated structures 
of governance to represent fairly each 
group of stakeholders. 
An overrepresentation of the generators 
questions the fair representation of the 
market actors in the ISOs ([2]). ISOs may 
then act under an unclear political pressure 
from different lobbying groups. In particular, 
generators prefer congested networks to 
use local market power. 
To conclude, network operators must 
deal with wide border effects. They can 
only be implemented as SOs because of 
the dual regulatory structure. Incentive 
regulation cannot then be enforced but self-
regulation may not ensure enough costs 
control because of an overrepresentation of 
the generators. 
 
Compatibility analysis 
 
The governance of PJM dictates the 
compatibility constraints between the 
implementations of TSO’s missions, as for 
costs control, the provision of locational 
signals and the coordination between 
TSOs.  
As for compatibility constraints due to 
costs control of transmission, self-regulated 
SOs faced congestion gaming in the late 
1990’s while using redispatch. In particular, 
PJM engaged itself in 1998 into 
implementing nodal pricing. The nodal 
pricing is the power flows externality 
management scheme the more 
appropriated to a SO such as PJM. Its not-
for-profit structure makes it indifferent to 
the counter-incentive effect of the 
congestion rent. As for the integration of 
losses in its nodal pricing, it may have been 
a secondary issue while PJM was focused 
on extending its area to neighbouring 
utilities. 
Nevertheless, congestion raised 
regulatory concerns until the 
implementation of the concept of Economic 
Planned Transmission Facilities in 2004 
because economic opportunity of network 
investments was not considered by PJM 
planning. Even if this concept has some 
Missions of TSO Implementations First-
best? 
Comments 
Management of: 
 Congestion 
 
Nodal pricing 
 
Yes 
 
 Loss Fixed rate No  
Development 
 Investment 
 
Congestion threshold 
criteria 
 
 
No 
 
recent, no loss cost, 
no risk assessment 
 Tariffs  - Deep cost for new 
generators 
 - Zonal UoS tariffs 
Partly No accommodation 
capacity 
Coordination Standardisation Yes In progress 
flaws, it is a first step for a SO to manage 
the network development in the long term. 
As for compatibility constraints due to 
the provision of locational signals, the 
“deep cost” do not allow an internalisation 
of the positive externality of network 
investments. Accommodation capacities on 
the PJM system are nevertheless missing 
for the connection costs to be auditable. 
As for compatibility constraints due to 
the coordination between TSOs, the 
FERC’s Standard Market Design displays a 
framework that allows a coordination by 
standardisation between ISOs and similar 
organisations at least for System 
Operation.  
 
4.3. Comparison of NGC to the ITSO 
 
Despite its flawed externality 
management scheme, the operation cost of 
NGC is under control. The network 
investments are consistent with the 
regulation and the need of the wholesale 
market. Besides, the zonal use of the 
system tariff has a contrasted impact on 
the location of the network users. The 
coordination with its neighbours seems to 
be a secondary problem because its 
network topology is little meshed.  
Implementations of NGC’s modules are 
summed up in the following chart: 
 
Table 3 Comparison between NGC and an 
ITSO 
 
 
4.4. Compatibility of the NGC’s modules 
Clarity of regulation 
 
The role of the energy regulator 
OFGEM, and to a lesser extent the 
European Commission and the DTI in the 
regulation of NGC and their relations are 
clear-cut. It has made the full unbundling of 
transmission network easier to reach.  
Despite the principles of subsidiarity and 
of independence of the regulator vis-à-vis 
the government, there are few public 
divergences between these organisations. 
Great Britain is often referred as a 
reference of power deregulation in Europe.  
Clear regulatory relations allow 
discretionary decisions about the industrial 
structure and particularly full transmission 
unbundling in order to ensure competition 
and a non-discriminatory open access to 
transmission network. NGC is a private 
independent TOSO that operates the 
power network of England and Wales. 
 
Transmission governance 
 
The NGC’s transmission ownership then 
allows the regulator OFGEM to use 
incentive schemes.  
The ownership of the network by the 
System Operator allows an efficient 
development of the network for two 
reasons. First, the revenue from the 
network ownership ensures that the 
financial penalties in the framework of an 
incentive regulation will not jeopardise the 
survival of the TSO. Second, an 
incentivised TOSO arbitrates between on 
the one hand short-run operation costs and 
small-scale investments with short payback 
and on the other hand small- and larger-
scale investments all the more that there 
are economies of scale in network 
investments ([10]).  
To conclude, a profit-maximising TOSO 
can minimise operation costs and reach a 
satisfactory network costs under the 
pressure of well-designed financial 
regulatory incentives. 
 
Compatibility analysis 
 
The governance of NGC dictates the 
compatibility constraints as for costs 
control, the provision of locational signals 
and the coordination between TSOs, 
between the implementation of operational 
modules.  
As for compatibility constraints due to 
costs control of transmission, the 
governance structure of NGC as a TOSO 
Missions of TSO Implementations First-
best? 
Comments 
Management of 
 Congestion 
 
Redispatch 
 
No 
 Loss Fixed rate No 
Network 
development 
 Investment 
 
Mainly engineering criteria 
Fuzzy economic criteria 
 
Near 
Decreasing 
trends and 
good results 
thanks to 
incentive 
regulation 
 Tariffs Zonal UoS tariffs 
Zonal accommodation 
capacities 
Near  
Coordination Combination No Little need 
allows an incentive regulation to reduce 
operation costs and control investments 
costs and even to compensate the 
theoretical flaws of suboptimal schemes 
such as redispatch.  
As for compatibility constraints due to 
the provision of locational signals, a nodal 
pricing could have been more 
advantageous ([8]). However, at the time of 
(re)designing the English and Welsh power 
market, the consumers (producers) that are 
mainly in the South (North) feared that their 
bill might increase (revenue might 
decrease) while the network would earn the 
rent ([8]). A zonal tariff provides a degree of 
cost causality while it reduces the entry 
barrier in particular for network demanding 
generators such as windfarms.  
As for compatibility constraints due to 
the coordination between TSOs, it is of little 
concerns in the case of NGC. Indeed, the 
NGC’s interconnectors create few loop 
flows. The France-England interconnector 
is a DC line whose flow is controllable. It is 
a separate merchant business out of the 
scope of the OFGEM ([10]). This is an 
institutional barrier to reach ideally a 
coupling between France and Great Britain. 
The overcapacity of the Scottish generators 
makes the flow on the Scottish 
interconnector quite predictable. And their 
high concentration justifies the Scottish 
interconnector being administrated rather 
than auctioned.  
 
5.  CONCLUSIVE REMARK ABOUT PJM 
AND NGC 
 
There is not really a better way to 
deviate from an “ideal first-best” TSO since 
each context is peculiar and the job of TSO 
is mainly determined by the incumbent 
topology and capacity of the network and 
its regulation. The NGC control area is a 
peculiar case of insularity. Therefore, 
coordination is only a secondary issue to 
NGC while the network development is its 
core activity. In the USA, the ISOs such as 
PJM are regional coordinators and the 
network development was only a 
secondary issue. As the coordination is a 
solved issue in the PJM area, the network 
development is becoming of importance to 
avoid a market balkanisation.  
 
6.  CONCLUSION 
 
Our operational and institutional modular 
analysis framework shows that the 
institutional context of TSO induces 
compatibility constraints between the 
implementations of its missions.  
Our empirical analysis concludes in a 
quite opposite way than some other drastic 
views (see for instance [6]). The ideal TSO 
is still the target to be reached (see [6]) 
thanks to the relevant institutional ground 
as they may ease the creation of wide 
market areas. But suboptimal network 
management schemes may be relatively 
efficient regarding the institutional context 
surrounding their implementation. All the 
more regulation may limit inefficiency in 
some cases. Besides, the windows of 
feasibility of such institutional modifications 
are short and limited (see [7]). Therefore, 
even suboptimal solutions must be deemed 
and studied because they may be the only 
ones to be institutionally implemented.  
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